Counterinsurgency (COIN, or NATO spelling counterinsurgency is “the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces“. The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any “military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries” and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history. Western thought on fighting ‘small wars’ gained interest during initial periods of European colonization, while modern thinking on counterinsurgency was developed during decolonization.
During insurgency and counterinsurgency, the distinction between civilians and combatants is often blurred. Counterinsurgency may involve attempting to win the hearts and minds of populations supporting the insurgency. Alternatively, it may be waged in an attempt to intimidate or eliminate civilian populations suspected of loyalty to the insurgency through indiscriminate violence.
Models or Examples:
The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea.
— Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong
Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda, Psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.
To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate.
In The Insurgent Archipelago, John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as “Maoist” and “post-Maoist” insurgency.
The My Lai Massacre Trial:
by: Andrew Morgan. October 4, 2016
Thirty-two years ago this month, nine helicopters carrying members of Charlie
Company landed in a rice paddy just south of the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai.
Four hours later, “My Lai was no more”: its buildings were destroyed and its
inhabitants–old men, women, children–lay dead or dying in ditches. No sooner
had the massacre ended, then the cover-up began. Only because of the
persistence and courage of two men, Hugh Thompson and Ronald Ridenhour, did what happen on the morning of March 16, 1968, come to light.
It would take three years, but finally the man who ordered the massacre of My
Lai civilians, Lieutenant William Calley, would have his fate decided by a
military jury in Fort Benning, Georgia following the longest court-martial in
United States history. Rejecting Calley’s defense of following superior orders,
the jury in March 1971 found Calley guilty of murder and sentenced him to life
in prison. The verdict did not sit well with the American public (nearly 80%
expressed disapproval), and represented a turning point in attitudes toward the
Viet Nam war. Shortly after the Calley verdict, polls for the first time
reported that a majority of Americans disapproved of the war in Southeast Asia.
The court-martial of William Calley is tough reading, but it is a story that
contains lessons we should never forget.
At 7:22 a.m. on March 16, nine helicopters lifted off for the flight to My Lai 4. By the time the helicopters carrying members of Charlie Company landed in a rice paddy about 140 yards south of My Lai, the area had been peppered with small arms fire from assault helicopters. Whatever VC might have been in the vicinity of My Lai had most likely left by the time the first soldiers climbed out of their helicopters. The assault plan called for Lt. Calley’s first platoon and Lt. Stephen Brooks’ second platoon to sweep into the village, while a third platoon, Medina, and the headquarters unit would be held in reserve and follow the first two platoons in after the area was more-or-less secured. Above the ground, the action would be monitored at the 1,000-foot level by Lt. Col. Barker and at the 2,500-foot level by Oran Henderson, commander of the 11th Brigade, both flying counterclockwise around the battle scene in helicopters.
My Lai village had about 700 residents. They lived in either red-brick homes or thatch-covered huts. A deep drainage ditch marked the eastern boundary of the village. Directly south of the residential area was an open plaza area used for holding village meetings. To the north and west of the village was dense foliage.
The Memorial Monument to Massacre at My Lai, Son My & My Khe on Saturday morning March 16, 1968.
Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, age 24, the heroic Helicopter pilot who stopped it.
The hero of My Lai Massacre, Ronald Ridenhour, the whistleblower who wrote thirty letters to Congressmen, President Richand Nixon & his Cabinet members.
